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A rational-expectations equilibrium with positive demand for financial information does exist 
under fully revealing asset price - contrary to a wide-held conjecture. Generalizing the 
common additive signal-return model with CARA utility to the family of distributions with 
moment generating functions, this paper shows that individual investors endowed with an 
average portfolio demand information in equilibrium if they can adjust portfolio size. More 
information diminishes the expected excess return of a risky asset so that investors who only 
have a choice of portfolio composition or whose asset endowments strongly differ from the 
average portfolio are worse off. Under fully revealing price, information market equilibria 
both with and without information acquisition are Pareto efficient. 
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I thank Vince Crawford, Mark Machina, Joel Sobel, Ross Starr, Joel Watson and seminar 
participants at UCSD for insightful suggestions. I owe the inspiration to Walter Novaes, 
whose casual remarks on CARA and moment generating functions at a meeting in Rio de 
Janeiro made me first ponder this approach. Any remaining mistakes are mine. A previous 
version of this paper circulated under the title “Demand for financial information under fully 
revealing asset price.” Contrary to a commonplace conjecture, a unique equilibrium with strictly
positive demand for ¯nancial information does exist under fully revealing
asset price|just as demand for public goods in other economic contexts is
positive albeit not necessarily socially optimal. Existence merely requires a
¯nite number of individual investors.
An equilibrium is called fully revealing if every investor can infer a su±-
cient statistic of all other investors' information from asset price. Similar to
benchmarks in other economic ¯elds|such as perfect competition in indus-
trial organization, the welfare theorems in microeconomic theory, or perfect
foresight in macroeconomics|, the benchmark case of fully revealing asset
prices may be unrealistic but it is instructive.1 Financial information ¯gures
prominently in recent research into ¯nancial markets and crises. However,
research tends to treat information receipt as exogenous to the investors'
decision problem.
This paper elucidates key properties of ¯nancial information and the in-
centives for its acquisition, clari¯es the detrimental e®ect of information on
the expected excess return of the asset to which it applies, underscores the
crucial importance of an intertemporal decision for the value of information
and investigates welfare properties of the equilibrium. The information mar-
ket equilibrium is e±cient in a Pareto sense both when investors choose to
acquire information and when they don't.
To make the case, this paper generalizes the widely used `additive signal-
return model' to the family of distribution functions with a moment gener-
ating function.
Assumption 1 (Additive signal-return structure). The gross asset return µ
of a risky asset is the sum of a fundamental S, which can become fully known
through the signal realization s, and independent noise ":
µ = S + ": (1)
Signal S and noise " are drawn from some real-valued support. The certain
gross return of a bond is R 2 (0;1).
1Some ¯nancial markets might be close to the benchmark. As Federal Reserve chair-
man Alan Greenspan remarked at the 21st Annual Monetary Conference Washington DC,
November 20, 2003: \My experience is that exchange markets have become so e±cient
that virtually all relevant information is embedded almost instantaneously in exchange
rates to the point that anticipating movements in major currencies is rarely possible."
2Since jointly normally distributed random variables can be transformed
into the sum of two independent normal random variables, all models with
a normally distributed signal and asset return share the structure of (1).
Strands of research that explicitly use additive signal-return models include,
for instance, those on information acquisition (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980),
delegated portfolio management (Bhattacharya and P°eiderer 1985), or cur-
rency attacks (Morris and Shin 1998). Together with assumption 1, two
further assumptions completely characterize the class of exchange economies
in this paper.
Assumption 2 (Common CARA). Investors evaluate portfolios with in-
tertemporally additive von Neumann-Morgenstern utility and share an iden-
tical degree of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA).
Assumption 3 (Single-price responses to information). The equilibrium
price of an asset only responds to signal realizations on its own return.
Assumption 2 requires the return distribution to have a moment generating
function. The present paper considers both an in¯nite number of investors
and an arbitrarily large ¯nite number of investors. However, an information
equilibrium exists only if there are ¯nitely many individuals.
An Illustration. Consider two assets, a bond B with certain gross return
R and a stock X with risky return µ. The stock sells at price P. CARA
utility gives rise to a risky asset demand function X(RP) so it is convenient
to refer to RP as the asset price in opportunity cost terms (of holding a
bond). In additive signal-return models with CARA utility, demand for the
stock is zero if opportunity cost RP equals the expected return E[µ]. As
opportunity cost RP falls below E[µ], an investor demands more and more
of the stock. Figure 1 depicts the resulting demand schedule X(RP) with a
solid curve.
An informed investors gets to observe realization s of the signal S. With
fully revealing price, there can only be two cases. Either no one acquires the
signal S. Or one investor acquires the signal S and everyone gets to know the
signal realization s through fully revealing price. An investor who anticipated
not to act on realization s would not acquire signal S (the entitlement to
receive s) in the ¯rst place. By analogy, fully revealing price gives every
investor the choice to either push an information button and broadcast the
30
Asset Demand and Average Asset Supply






E E S[ [ ,  )|  ]] S S X RP (
X RP ( )
{
{
E[ ] -RP 2
E[ ] -RP(S) 2
E E E [ ]= [ [ ]] S |S 2 2
E[ ] 2
E[ | ] 2 sL
Figure 1: Asset Demand and Expected Excess Return
signal realization to everyone, or, alternatively, to keep everyone uninformed.2
So, equilibrium price P(s) depends on the signal realization if at least one
investor acquires the signal, otherwise P is independent of S.
In additive signal-return models with CARA utility and identical risk
preferences, the unique equilibrium allocation of the stock is symmetric ir-
respective of the investor's wealth. No matter whether or not information
is acquired, every investor ends up with the average amount of the stock ¹ x
in her portfolio (the `market portfolio'). Suppose no investor acquires the
signal. Then the unique asset-market equilibrium results in an opportunity
cost RP as depicted in ¯gure 1.
When, on the other hand, one investor acquires the signal S, a message
with the signal realization s goes out to everyone before portfolios are chosen.
Should an investor acquire the signal S in the ¯rst place? Post notitiam (af-
ter the signal realization), price may go up in response to a good realization
(sH) or go down in response to bad news (sL). Figure 1 shows these possibil-
ities as dotted lines. Ante notitiam (before the signal realization), however,
the intercept of the demand curve stays put since, by the law of iterated
expectations, the expected return remains unaltered at ES [E[µjS]] = E[µ].
2Joel Watson pointed out this analogy.
4Information (the ability to condition on s) reduces the risk post notitiam.
So, for any given opportunity cost RP(s), asset demand will be higher. This
results in an upward turn of the demand curve. Figure 1 depicts the re-
sulting expected demand curve ES [E[X(RP(S);S)jS]]. The expected new
equilibrium price is E[RP(S)] > RP. The asset's expected excess return over
opportunity cost just went down, falling from E[µ ¡ RP(S)] to E[µ ¡ RP].
Although the stock has lost attractiveness relative to the bond, the investor
will still have to put ¹ x in her portfolio since equilibrium is symmetric both
with and without information. This strictly worsens her utility ante notitiam.
But there are two bene¯ts of information.
First, an investor who has information scheduled to arrive anticipates to
reshu²e the asset composition of her portfolio (of given size). This reduces
the expected variance of her future consumption ante notitiam (by variance
decomposition ES [V(µjS)] = V(µ)¡VS (E[µjS])). As it turns out in additive
signal-return models with CARA utility, the diminishing expected excess
return just wipes out the bene¯ts from improved asset composition. So,
no signal will be acquired in equilibrium, and the absence of information is
e±cient in a Pareto sense.
Second, an investor who has information scheduled to arrive also antic-
ipates to adjust her consumption path and the size of her portfolio. This
bene¯t from improved intertemporal choice outweighs the costs from dimin-
ishing expected excess returns for an investor with a `market endowment' of
stocks. So, when investors are allowed to change their portfolio size in re-
sponse to information, in addition to their portfolio composition, then there is
a joint competitive equilibrium in asset and information markets under fully
revealing price in which one, and only one, investor with close-to-average
initial stock holdings acquires the signal. This equilibrium too is e±cient in
a Pareto sense.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews
equilibrium conjectures for information demand under fully revealing asset
price. Section 2 elaborates the model and establishes its fully revealing ¯nan-
cial market equilibrium (under assumptions 1 through 3). In following Gross-
man and Stiglitz (1980), section 3 derives the information market equilibrium
when investors only have a choice between assets. The unique equilibrium is
one with no information. Section 4 presents the reason: More information
diminishes the excess return of the risky asset over its opportunity costs.
Section 5 revisits the information market equilibrium when investors can
condition their intertemporal savings decision on the signal realization and
5shows that the unique type of equilibrium is either one with or one without
information acquisition. Section 6 concludes.
1 Equilibrium Conjectures in the Literature
There is an extensive literature on the generic existence of a rational ex-
pectations equilibrium with fully revealing asset prices (e.g. Radner 1979,
Jordan 1983, Citanna and Villanacci 2000). However, papers in this lit-
erature generally stop short of investigating the incentives for investors to
acquire information in the ¯rst place.
Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) ¯rst outlined and Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) later formulated the following no-equilibrium paradox for ¯nancial
markets (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980, conjecture 6):
In the limit, when there is no [exogenous] noise [in prices], prices
convey all information, and there is no incentive to purchase in-
formation. Hence, the only possible equilibrium is one with no
information. But if everybody is uninformed, it clearly pays some
individual to become informed. Thus, there does not exist a com-
petitive equilibrium.
There are numerous more instances of this `no-equilibrium conjecture' in the
literature. Romer (1993) argues, for instance, that no equilibrium exists
for CARA utility and a normally distributed asset return if price is fully
revealing because signal realizations enter price in a linear way. Barlevy and
Veronesi (2000) remark more recently: \Finally, as Grossman and Stiglitz
point out, we need to prevent prices from being fully revealing; otherwise an
equilibrium will fail to exist."
Approaches to overcome the no-equilibrium paradox under fully reveal-
ing prices include Jackson (1991) with price setting investors, or Jackson
and Peck (1999) with investors who submit demand functions in a Shapley-
Shubik fashion. Routledge (1999) considers adaptive learning from past price
so that investors cannot condition on current price. To my knowledge, the
no-equilibrium conjecture has so far not been reconsidered in the original
Walrasian equilibrium with rational expectations. Though that equilibrium
concept has shortcomings, it remains a common framework in ¯nancial con-
texts. The present paper extends the model by an information acquisition
stage and generalizes it to the family of distributions with moment generating
6functions. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) posed the `no-equilibrium' conjec-
ture in the context of in¯nitely many investors. An arbitrarily large but ¯nite
number of investors su±ces for existence of a fully revealing equilibrium with
well-de¯ned information demand.
The `no-equilibrium conjecture' lent support to the claim that ¯nancial
markets could, by their mere logic, never be informationally e±cient in a fully
revealing sense. Admati (1991) summarizes this view succinctly: \[T]his im-
possibility result is important since it examines the theoretical and concep-
tual underpinnings of the frequently used notion of e±cient ¯nancial mar-
kets. It ...shows that under some conditions it is logically impossible for
¯nancial markets to be e±cient in the `strong' sense that they re°ect all the
information in the market" (Admati's emphasis).
While reasons abound why ¯nancial markets may not be information-
ally ine±cient, this paper argues that the sources of these ine±ciencies are
more subtle than outright impossibility when an arbitrarily large but ¯nite
number of investors is rational. If the unique equilibrium is one with no
information as in section 3 of this paper, the outcome is e±cient in the sense
that a social planner would also allocate no information. Conversely, when
the unique equilibrium entails positive information as in section 5, the in-
formation equilibrium is e±cient even when some investors would be better
o® without information. A social planner obeying the Pareto criterion can-
not take the indivisible signal from the acquiring investor since that would
leave at least this investor worse o® by revealed preference. In presenting
information demand under fully revealing asset price, this paper revisits the
overlooked benchmark case of informational e±ciency.
2 Fully Revealing Equilibrium
This section shows that an asset-market equilibrium in an additive signal-
return model with CARA utility is symmetric and fully reveals the signal
realization s. It is unique if the share of informed investors is known at
the time of the portfolio choice. Then the information equilibrium too is
symmetric, given an indivisible signal S, in the sense that either all investors
are informed or no investor is informed.
Consider a ¯nite number I of investors with arbitrary time preferences
and arbitrary initial wealth. Investor i holds initial wealth W i
0 and chooses
consumption Ci
0 today along with a portfolio (Bi;Xi) to secure consumption
7Ci
1 tomorrow. There is no income in period 1 other than asset returns.
So, Ci
1 = RBi + µXi and Ci
0 = W i




0 given asset price P(s), which is known at the time of
these choices. Under CARA, investor i's period utility becomes v(C) =
¡expf¡ACg, where A > 0 is the Pratt-Arrow measure of absolute risk








where either ®=0 or ®=1, and ¯i 2 (0;1) is the time discount factor. Just
as Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) do, sections 3 and 4 of this paper consider
a terminal consumption maximization problem with ® = 0. Section 5 will
consider the intertemporal consumption problem with ®=1.
CARA utility requires the return distribution to have a moment gen-
erating function (MGF). The MGF of a random variable Z is de¯ned as
MZ(t) ´ E[expftZg] 2 (0;1). So, a CARA investor's expected utility can











MGFs exist for many distributions. An MGF Mµ(t) is continuously dif-
ferentiable in t by de¯nition. The MGF of the sum of two independent
random variables is the product of the two underlying MGFs (Casella and
Berger 1990, Theorem 4.6.3). So, the MGF of the risky return µ = S + "
is Mµ(t) = MS(t)M"(t). Similarly, the MGF of the conditional stock return
given known signal realization s is Mµjs(t) = expfstgM"(t).
Irrespective of whether investor i has a choice of the asset allocation only
(® =0) or an intertemporal choice in addition (® =1), investor i's demand
















when investor i only has an inter-asset choice (®=0 so Ci

















when investor i also has an intertemporal choice (® = 1). The Walrasian
auctioneer presents P(s) to every investor at the time of portfolio choice.
8Table 1: Examples of Distributions in the Singleton Class





















































Normal ¾2 + (¹ + ¾2t)2 > (¹ + ¾2t)2 any ¹;¾









t2 > 0 any a;b
aIncludes special cases such as the exponential, Â2, and Erlang distributions.
Maximizing expected utility|i.e. maximizing either (2) over Xi, or (3)









where the prime in M0
µ(¢) denotes the ¯rst derivative of the MGF w.r.t. its
argument t. Equation (4) can also be viewed as the inverse demand function
for the stock. Bond demand Bi 2 R satis¯es the wealth constraint. Figure 1
depicts examples of stock demand. The inverse demand function intersects
with the price axis at RP = E[µ] for Xi = 0. Further properties depend on
the underlying return distribution.
Singleton Family of Distributions. The ¯rst- and second-order condi-
tions for a unique global equilibrium impose restrictions on the distribution
of µ = S +". There is a family of MGFs that satisfy the restrictions of both
the ¯rst- and second-order conditions so that equilibrium is a singleton. Call
the family of distributions with such MGFs the singleton family.
9Lemma 1 (Singleton Family of Distributions). Under CARA utility, de-
















for t < 0.
Proof. Per-capita asset supply can take any value x 2 (0;1), and so can
Xi. De¯ne t ´ ¡AXi 2 (¡1;0). The ¯rst inequality in (5) is a restatement
of the ¯rst-order condition (4), while the latter condition is a restatement of
the second-order condition equivalent (26) in appendix B.
Lemma 1 applies to CARA utility irrespective of whether µ stems from
an additive signal-return distribution or not. The ¯rst inequality in lemma 1
states that interior asset demand is viable at non-zero price. The second
condition implies that asset demand (4) strictly decreases in asset price (see
¯gure 1), making it unique, and that the ratio M0
µ(t)=Mµ(t) strictly increases
in t|an important property for later derivations. The second condition
becomes the variance of µ at t=0. It is straightforward to show that if both
the distribution of S and the distribution of " satisfy (5) individually then
their sum satis¯es (5).
Common distribution functions belong to the singleton family of lemma 1.
The binomial, gamma, geometric, Laplace, normal (Gaussian), Poisson, and
uniform distributions are examples of distributions that satisfy condition (5)
(see table 1).
Fully Revealing Financial Market Equilibrium. If the share of in-
formed investors ¸ 2 [0;1] is known to all investors at the time of their
portfolio choice, assumptions 1 and 2 su±ce to make the fully revealing ¯-
nancial market equilibrium unique. Then, either ¸ = 0, or ¸ = 1 as soon as
one investor acquires the signal.
Consider any ¸. De¯ne x ´
PI
i=1 Xi
0=I as average asset supply per
investor. A ¯nancial market equilibrium requires that the market for the
risky asset clears
¸Xinf. + (1 ¡ ¸)Xuninf. = x, (6)
where Xinf. and Xuninf. denote demands of informed and uninformed investors,
respectively.
10Since Mµ(t) = MS(t)M"(t) by independence of S and ", stock demand of

























given the observed signal realization s. Note that M0
S (0)=MS (0) = E[s]
so that the stock demand schedules share the same intercept ante notitiam
(before the signal realization is observed) as depicted in ¯gure 1.
Theorem 1 (Fully Revealing Financial Market Equilibrium). In additive
signal-return models with CARA utility and arbitrary initial endowments of
the risky asset (assumptions 1 and 2), a symmetric and fully revealing ¯nan-
cial market equilibrium exists. It is unique if the share of informed investors
¸ is common knowledge at the time of the Walrasian auctioning process.
Proof. Using ¸ = 1 and Xi = ¹ x in (6), (7) and (8) shows that a symmet-
ric ¯nancial market equilibrium exists. Equilibrium price is fully revealing
because RP(s) is invertible in the signal realization by (8).
Suppose ¸ 2 (0;1] is common knowledge at the time of the Walrasian
auctioning process. Then rational stock demand of an informed investor
satis¯es (8), given the observed signal realization s, while an uninformed
investor can infer each other uninformed investor's rational choice of Xuninf.
from her own choice (7). Hence, every uninformed investor can infer informed




RP from (8). So, the symmetric and fully revealing equilibrium is unique if
¸ is known. If ¸ = 0, the equilibrium is unique and symmetric, and fully
revealing in the degenerate sense that nothing can be revealed.
Known risk aversion is a necessary condition for price to be fully reveal-
ing since the realization of s cannot be inferred from an informed investor's
demand unless his risk aversion is known. Jordan (1983) shows in addition
that constant (absolute or relative) risk aversion, of which risk neutrality is a
11limiting case, is necessary for a fully revealing equilibrium to exist under reg-
ularity conditions. With the additive signal-return structure (assumption 1),
theorem 1 provides a su±cient condition for existence (and for uniqueness if
¸ is known). Assumption 1 does not require the state space to be ¯nite and
is, in this regard, more general than other su±cient conditions (e.g. Citanna
and Villanacci 2000). If the share of informed investors ¸ is not known at the
time of portfolio choice, or if there are di®erent degrees of being informed in
the presence of more than one signal, partially revealing equilibria could be
supported alongside the fully revealing equilibrium, depending on the beliefs
that investors are allowed to hold about other investors. The focus of this
paper, however, lies on fully revealing equilibrium.
3 No-information Equilibrium
Does any investor i have an incentive to acquire the signal under a fully
revealing asset price? To investigate the answer, ¯rst consider the case where
investors only face an inter-asset decision but have no intertemporal choice.
Section 5 will extend the problem to an intertemporal setting.
Under fully revealing price, information is a public commodity. Two
equilibrium de¯nitions are commonly applied to public commodities: (i) Nash
equilibria, or (ii) public goods equilibria in the style of Samuelson (1954).
Both concepts rest on the following principle.
De¯nition 1 (Competitive REE). A competitive rational expectations equi-
librium (REE) in an exchange economy is an allocation of commodities and
assets to agents, along with a price for each unit of the commodities and as-
sets, so that no agent wants to acquire amounts that di®er from this allocation
subject to the observed choice of other agents and a wealth constraint.
The ¯nancial market equilibrium in theorem 1 satis¯es this equilibrium de¯-
nition for asset demand. It remains to establish the competitive equilibrium
for the signal S. If at least one investor buys the signal S, everyone becomes
fully informed of s after its transmission and it is not rational for any other
investor to acquire the signal again. So, there can be at most one investor to
whom the indivisible signal S is allocated in a competitive equilibrium under
fully revealing price. Will there be one investor to acquire the signal?
Grossman and Stiglitz' (1980) concise solution strategy uses investors'
indirect utility in ¯nancial equilibrium to determine the information equilib-
12rium. Applying (7) and (8) to (2), we obtain an investor i's indirect utility
post notitiam in a ¯nancial market equilibrium with no information (¸=0)
and with full information (¸ = 1). In the absence of an informed investor,








0 ¡ ARP (X
i
0 ¡ x)gMS(¡Ax)M"(¡Ax); (9)
where RP = M0
S(¡Ax)=MS(¡Ax) + M0
"(¡Ax)=M"(¡Ax) by (7).












0 ¡ x)g expf¡AxsgM"(¡Ax);
(10)
since Mµjs = expf¡AxsgM"(¡Ax). In this equilibrium, RP(s) = s +
M0
"(¡Ax)=M"(¡Ax) by (8).
At the time when investor i chooses whether or not to acquire a costly
signal S, its realization s must still be unknown. So, the investor bases
information demand on a comparison between the ante notitiam indirect
utilities with and without the expected receipt of a signal realization. If the




information acquisition is worthwhile for investor i. Recall that V i<0 under
CARA utility so that this ratio must fall below unity. For costly signals, (11)
must hold with strict inequality.
For CARA utility and an additive signal-return distribution, condition
(11) translates into a restriction on the MGF of the signal distribution (called
criterion CritIAC(t;ti
0) for inter-asset choice IAC below). As it turns out, this
restriction is never satis¯ed for signal distributions in the singleton family.
So, no investor has an incentive to acquire the signal if the only choice is
an inter-asset decision. The unique information equilibrium is one with zero
information.
Theorem 2 (Unique No-information Equilibrium under Inter-asset Choice).
In additive signal-return models with CARA utility and arbitrary initial en-
dowments of the risky asset (assumptions 1 and 2), when a ¯nite number of
13investors has an inter-asset choice, price is fully revealing and information
demand criterion (11) is satis¯ed if and only if
CritIAC(t;t
i
0) :´ lnMS(t) ¡ lnMS(t
i







Signal distributions in the singleton family (5) strictly violate this criterion
so that the unique equilibrium is one in which no investor acquires a signal.
Proof. Since investors' signal choices are known under equilibrium de¯ni-
tion 1, price is fully revealing by theorem 1. Appendix C derives the infor-
mation demand criterion.
So, if the signal has a common distribution from table 1 or falls into the
singleton family (5) more generally, the unique equilibrium entails no infor-
mation acquisition.3 Worse, investors would pay not to receive information.
However, in an investor's view, the ante notitiam variance of the asset return
falls ES [V(µjS)] = V(µ) ¡ VS (E[µjS]) by a common decomposition result
(Casella and Berger 1990, Theorem 4.4.2). Why can signal acquisition be
undesirable for every signal investor although ante notitiam indirect utility
would rise with reduced risk?
4 Diminishing Expected Excess Return
There is no demand for information when investors merely have an inter-
asset choice because, ante notitiam, information diminishes the expected
excess return of the asset
ES [E[µ ¡ RP(S)jS]] = Eante [µ] ¡ REante [P(S)]
over its opportunity cost. The expected excess return falls because investors
facing less uncertainty post notitiam will bid up the asset price. The expected
3It is conceivable that a distribution of S exists outside the singleton family so that both
the distribution of " and the distribution of µ = S + " fall into the singleton family. This
possibility, which would satisfy the requirements of a unique and well-de¯ned ¯nancial
market equilibrium both in the full-information and the no-information case, is neither
ruled out nor con¯rmed here.
14higher asset price more than o®sets anticipated utility gains from lower risk
when there is only an inter-asset choice.
While information does not a®ect ES [E[µjS]] = Eante [µ] by the law of
iterated expectations, the anticipated asset price Eante [P(S)] is higher in the
equilibrium with information than Eante [P] without information. Informa-
tion lowers risk, increases asset demand and raises asset price. This reduces
the value of the risky asset relative to the bond. Figure 1 illustrates this
e®ect. Ultimately, the diminishing excess return decreases expected con-
sumption tomorrow because Ci
1 depends positively on the excess return of
the stock over its opportunity cost (µ ¡RP). In additive signal-return mod-
els with CARA utility and fully revealing price, the losses from diminishing
excess returns outweigh the gains from better information when there is only
an inter-asset choice.
The negative e®ect of information on excess return occurs under general
conditions. Any signal distribution function in the singleton family satis¯es
the following condition (13) for diminishing excess returns.
Theorem 3 (Diminished Expected Excess Return). In additive signal-re-
turn models with CARA utility and arbitrary initial endowments of the risky
asset (assumptions 1 and 2), when asset price is anticipated to fully reveal
a signal realization s, the signal S strictly reduces the ante notitiam excess







for t < 0. This condition is satis¯ed for any distribution of S in the singleton
family (5).
Proof. De¯ne t ´ ¡Ax. By the law of iterated expectations, the di®er-
ence between the excess returns with and without information acquisition is
¡ES [RP(S) ¡ RP]. Using the ¯rst-order conditions for informed investors
(8) and uninformed investors (7) and taking prior expectations, the di®er-
ence becomes ¡E[S] + M0
S(t)=MS(t), which, by the properties of an MGF,
is strictly negative if and only if (13) is satis¯ed. At t = 0, condition (13)
turns into an equality. MGFs of distributions in the singleton family result
in strictly falling asset demand by (5). So, as t falls, the left-hand side of
(13) is reduced further below zero.
15In additive signal-return models with CARA utility and for common sig-
nal distributions, the information equilibrium exists but entails zero informa-
tion demand if investors only have an inter-asset choice in a portfolio of given
size. This resolves one part of Grossman and Stiglitz' (1980) no-equilibrium
paradox. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980, conjecture 6) write (our emphasis):
...But if everybody is uninformed, it clearly pays some individual
to become informed. Thus, there does not exist a competitive
equilibrium.
The emphasized part of this conjecture can fail. Theorem 3 shows that
information diminishes a risky asset's excess returns in general. So, it may
never pay any investor to become informed in an additive signal-return model
with CARA utility under a normal distribution of the signal or other common
distributions. A competitive equilibrium does exist. It is unique and entails
zero demand for information by theorem 2 when investors only have an inter-
asset choice. Furthermore, the equilibrium is e±cient in the sense that a
benevolent social planner would not want any investor to acquire information.
If there were in¯nitely many investors, each investor with a measure zero,
then individual demand would not a®ect the Walrasian price ¯nding process
and individual information would not be revealed. The expected excess re-
turns would remain unaltered. However, a full measure of investors has an
incentive to acquire the information so that information would be revealed.
This non-concavity from the assumption of in¯nitely many investors, where
each individual investor has no price impact while the full measure has the
full impact, lies behind the no-equilibrium paradox. With a ¯nite number of
investors, the value of information is well de¯ned. The value of information
is strictly negative in additive signal-return models when investors only have
an inter-asset choice.
However, the diminishing excess return does not exert a su±ciently neg-
ative utility e®ect to prevent information acquisition if investors have an
intertemporal consumption choice in addition to the mere inter-asset choice.
5 Information Equilibrium
This section shows that a unique equilibrium with strictly positive informa-
tion demand does exist under fully revealing asset price when information
arrives before investors take their intertemporal consumption decision. With
16an intertemporal choice, investors can adjust the size of their portfolio in
response to the signal realization. The anticipation of information raises
the ante notitiam utility of investors further than when their response to
information is limited to an inter-asset choice. Loosely speaking, investors
anticipated ability to condition both Ci
0(s) and Ci
1(s) on the signal realiza-
tion s (and not only Ci
1(s)) presents enough bene¯ts to acquire the signal
S. One, and only one, investor with close-to-average initial stock holdings
has a strictly positive incentive to acquire the signal in a joint asset and
information market equilibrium under fully revealing price. Consequently,
everybody becomes informed.
When investors have an intertemporal consumption choice, the ¯rst order






















Whereas the bond return R was a parameter in the ¯nal consumption maxi-
mization problem, R now serves to clear the bond market (see appendix E).
Ante notitiam, R is given and independent of signal acquisition by the law of
iterated expectations. However, the bond return can respond to the signal
realization post notitiam and correlate with other payo®s in indirect utility.
To keep the analysis to closed-form solutions, I assume that the signal re-
alization s alters R negligibly little. This assumption can be justi¯ed for
an economy with a small stock endowment compared to the remaining asset
markets (see appendix E for a formal derivation). So, I consider R as in-
sensitive to information on the small stock market. This assumption makes
the present intertemporal model more closely comparable to Grossman and
Stiglitz' (1980) inter-asset choice under deterministic R.
Applying (7) and (8) to (14), we obtain an investor i's post notitiam
indirect utility in a ¯nancial market equilibrium with no information (¸=0)
and with full information (¸ = 1). In the absence of an informed investor,



















where RP = M0
S(¡Ax)=MS(¡Ax) + M0
"(¡Ax)=M"(¡Ax) by (7).
17Post notitiam, an informed investor's expected indirect utility E[V ijs] in


















since Mµjs = expf¡AxsgM"(¡Ax). In this equilibrium, RP(s) = s +
M0
"(¡Ax)=M"(¡Ax) by (8).
As discussed in section 3 before, investor i bases information choice on
a comparison between the ante notitiam indirect utilities with and with-





then information acquisition is worthwhile.
Under CARA and an additive signal-return distribution, condition (11)
translates into a restriction on the MGF of the signal distribution (criterion
CritITC(t;ti
0) for intertemporal choice ITC below). Contrary to the earlier
¯nding in section 3, this restriction can be satis¯ed for signal distributions
in the singleton family. An investor with close-to-average endowments of
the risky asset (a `market portfolio' endowment) has an incentive to acquire
the signal on the stock return if she can take the intertemporal consump-
tion decision after observing the signal realization. However, at most one
investor can optimally acquire the indivisible signal in a competitive equilib-
rium of de¯nition 1. Then the unique information equilibrium is one with
full information.
Theorem 4 (Unique Information Equilibrium under Intertemporal Choice).
In additive signal-return models with CARA utility, arbitrary initial endow-
ments of the risky asset and single-price responses to signal realizations (as-
sumptions 1 through 3), when a ¯nite number of investors has an intertem-
poral choice in addition to the inter-asset choice, price is fully revealing and
information demand criterion (11) is satis¯ed if and only if
CritITC(t;t
i














Signal distributions in the singleton family (5) satisfy this criterion for R > 0
and a su±ciently small di®erence t¡ti
0. Then the unique type of equilibrium
18is one in which one and only one investor with a strictly positive initial risky
asset endowment, su±ciently close to the average endowment, acquires the
costly signal. Otherwise the unique equilibrium is one in which no investor
acquires the signal.
Proof. Since investors' signal choices are known under equilibrium de¯ni-
tion 1, price is fully revealing by theorem 1. Appendix F derives the infor-
mation demand criterion.
The average investor with a `market portfolio' endowment Xi
0 = x has a
strict incentive to acquire the signal for R > 0, which is satis¯ed since R is
bound away from zero in intertemporal equilibrium (see appendix E). Other
investors with endowments Xi
0 close to x may also demand information. So,
multiple equilibria can exist in the sense that it is indeterminate who exactly
acquires the signal. However, the information level is unique: There is full
information, irrespective of who bears the cost of acquiring the indivisible
signal.
The intertemporal choice allows investors to adjust their portfolio size
in response to the signal realization. Anticipating this additional choice,
investors value information more than they do if they only have a choice be-
tween assets. The expected portfolio size is larger in the presence of informa-





(see (23) in appendix A), so the ante notitiam di®erence between the ex-
























The di®erence is strictly positive by t;ti
0 < 0 and diminishing-excess-return
theorem 3. Better information leads every investor to save more. In fact,
the portfolio value increases more strongly than the stock price due to the
wealth e®ect of the price increase (re°ected in the term ti
0=R).
A Gaussian example. For a normally distributed signal with mean ¹S
and variance ¾2
S the MGF is MS(t) = expf¹St + (¾2
S=2)t2g so that crite-







0 ¡ x)2 > 0:
19The average investor with `market portfolio' endowment Xi
0 = x has a strict
incentive to acquire the signal. So, the unique type of equilibrium is one
with full information. Would a social planner implement this equilibrium
outcome? An equilibrium with full information must be Pareto optimal in
an additive signal-return model since the acquiring investor is better o® with
the signal by revealed preference. However, while any equilibrium with in-
formation must be Pareto optimal in this sense, signal acquisition can reduce
overall welfare.
Suppose, for instance, that investor i initially holds the entire endowment
of stocks while the I¡1 remaining investors have their initial wealth in bonds
only. The single stock owner acquires the signal because the expected price
increase awards her with the wealth e®ect of a more valuable initial portfolio.
In particular, for a total of three investors R > 5
4 satis¯es criterion (17); for
a total of four investors R > 9
7 is needed. A social planner who follows the
Pareto criterion cannot improve on this equilibrium outcome since taking
away the signal would make investor i worse of. However, overall welfare
may fall with signal acquisition. In the example, the unweighted sum of the
logs of ante notitiam indirect utilities is equal to the sum of criterion (17)
over all investors. The sum over criterion (17) becomes R=(1+R) ¡ (I¡1),
which is negative for three investors and any R ¸ 0 (though it exceeds ¡13
9
by R > 5
4). Although the Pareto criterion judges information acquisition in
additive signal-return models necessarily as socially optimal, there can yet
be cases when overall welfare drops with more information as it diminishes
the excess return for everyone.
Theorem 4 addresses the ¯rst part of Grossman and Stiglitz' (1980) no-
equilibrium conjecture. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980, conjecture 6) write
(our emphasis):
In the limit, when there is no [exogenous] noise [in prices], prices
convey all information, and there is no incentive to purchase in-
formation ...
Theorem 4 refutes this part of the conjecture. It does pay an investor with
`market portfolio' endowments of the risky asset to become informed in an
additive signal-return model with CARA utility under common signal dis-
tributions. For the individual decision to acquire a public good, given other
agents' choice of zero, only individual incentives matter. However, at most
one investor will ¯nd it optimal to acquire the signal.
20If there were in¯nitely many investors, each investor with a measure zero,
then a strictly positive measure of investors would be needed to acquire the
same signal so that price can reveal information. However, individual de-
mand would not a®ect the Walrasian price ¯nding process and every single
investor who acquired a duplicate of the signal would be better o® not ac-
quiring it. Again, this non-concavity from the assumption of in¯nitely many
investors, where each individual investor has no price impact while an ar-
bitrarily small but strictly positive measure has the full impact needed for
price to be revealing, lies behind the no-equilibrium paradox.
When there is a ¯nite number of investors, no matter how many investors
have an incentive to acquire information, an allocation of the indivisible signal
to any of the investors with positive information demand is a competitive
equilibrium. Given the signal allocation, the paying investor would be worse
o® without the signal as long as the signal cost is low enough, no other
investor with positive information demand wants to pay for the duplicate
of fully revealed information, and those investors who prefer no information
have no choice in a competitive equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
Contrary to a common no-equilibrium conjecture, an information market
equilibrium does exist in additive signal-return models with CARA utility
for all distribution functions with moment generating functions. Investors
acquire information to a socially desirable degree under fully revealing price
and, whenever no information is acquired, a social planner agrees with that
market outcome. However, information is not bene¯cial to every investor.
Even when acquired, there may be investors who would prefer that there were
less information in the market because information diminishes the excess
return of a risky asset.
Additive signal-return structures are common to many brands of research
into information e®ects in ¯nancial markets. While investors' receipt of in-
formation is often treated as exogenous, results of the present paper are
reassuring. Rational investors demand ¯nancial information to a Pareto ef-
¯cient extent even in the extreme benchmark case of a fully revealing asset
price.
21Appendix
A First-order conditions and portfolio value
De¯ne t ´ ¡AXi 2 (¡1;0).
















Equation (4) in the text is an equivalent condition.




















































respectively, where Hi ´ expf¡A[(1+R)Bi + P(s)Xi ¡ Wi
0]g. Dividing the latter
by the former equation implies equation (4) in the text as a necessary condition.
Note that Hi, Wi
0, Ci
1 and Ci
0 are functions of s since RP(s) is.
With the de¯nition of Hi, the optimal portfolio value can be written
















where the second line follows from (21).
22B Second-order conditions
De¯ne t ´ ¡AXi 2 (¡1;0).
When investor i maximizes terminal consumption only and ®=0, the second-


























When investor i also has an intertemporal choice (®=1), the matrix of cross-
derivatives for the two assets Bi and Xi becomes










by (19) and (20). If A is negative de¯nite, a unique global utility maximum
results. Equivalently, we require ¡A to be positive de¯nite and all upper-left
sub-matrices must have positive determinants. Since the upper-left entry in A is
strictly positive, negative de¯niteness of A is equivalent to


















since Mµjs(t) > 0. This condition implies that M0
µjs(t)=Mµjs(t) is strictly monoton-
ically increasing in t, or strictly monotonically decreasing in Xi for t ´ ¡AXi.




< 0 for CARA utility, condition (24) is equiv-
alent to (26).
C Proof of theorem 2


















for t ´ ¡Ax < 0 and ti
0 ´ ¡AXi
0 < 0. Using this result and (9) in information












23Since MS(t) > 0 for ¯nite t by de¯nition of an MGF, taking logs is permissible
and yields (12).
Taking the ¯rst derivative of CritIAC(t;ti
0) with respect to t
@CritIAC(t;ti











shows that criterion (12) is strictly increasing in t for t < ti
0 and strictly decreasing
in t for t > ti
0 since M00
S(t)=MS(t) > [M0
S(t)=MS(t)]2 by (5), while it attains the
value CritIAC(t;t) = 0 in its global maximum at t = ti
0. This establishes the ¯rst
statement: No single investor has an incentive to acquire a costly signal. Unique-
ness of the no-information equilibrium follows since no more than one investor can
optimally acquire an indivisible public commodity by de¯nition 1.
D Indirect utility post notitiam under inter-
temporal choice
Under the de¯nition Hi ´ expf¡A[(1+R)Bi + P(s)Xi ¡ Wi






0 ¡ P(s)Xi ¡ 1
A lnHi¢
:
Note that Hi and Wi
0 are functions of s since RP(s) is. Using this fact along





























for ®=1. The second step follows from the ¯rst order condition (21) for the bond,
substituting it for HiMµ(¡AXi). Indirect utility (14) in the text follows using
(21) once more. Function (14) is a proper indirect utility function since the asset
price P(s) in equilibrium re°ects the ¯rst order condition (22) for the risky asset.
E Bond return response to stock return in-
formation
Taking logs of both sides of the bond ¯rst order condition (21) yields
A(1+R)Bi ¡ ABi
0 + AP(s)(Xi ¡ Xi
0) = ln¯iRMµ(¡AXi);
24a permissible operation since ¯i;R;Mµ(¢) > 0 by their de¯nitions. Summing up
both sides over investors i and dividing by their total number (measure) yields
expfARbg=¯iR = Mµ(t); (27)




0=I, and t ´ ¡Ax. Equation (27) implicitly determines the
gross bond return R. By the implicit function theorem,
@R=@b = ¡AR2=(AbR ¡ 1):
So, the bond return increases in response to a higher bond endowment if b <
1=(AR) but it would fall if b > 1=(AR). Since R falls arbitrarily (in¯nitely)
strongly at b = 1=(AR) + ² for an arbitrarily small ² > 0, the equilibrium is not
well de¯ned for b > 1=(AR). This restricts the model to b · b0 = 1=(AR0) for





= Mµ(t) by the law of iterated expectations, information
acquisition on the stock return does not a®ect the bond return ante notitiam.
Post notitiam, however, Mµjs(t) = expfstgM"(t) and R does respond to the signal








The bond return falls in response to a favorable signal realization s since b ·
1=(AR). In principle, R too is a function of the signal realization s. For small




So, R ¼ R¸=1 ¼ R¸=0 in the presence of a small stock endowment relative to the
bond endowment.
F Proof of theorem 4

























for t ´ ¡Ax < 0 and ti
0 ´ ¡AXi
0 < 0. Using this result and (15) in information

















25where R 2 (0;1). Since MS(t) > 0 for ¯nite t by de¯nition of an MGF, taking
logs is permissible and yields (17).
Taking the ¯rst derivative of CritITC(t;ti















shows that criterion (17) is strictly increasing in t for t < ti
0 and strictly decreasing
in t for t > ti
0 since M00
S(t)=MS(t) > [M0
S(t)=MS(t)]2 by (5), while it attains its
global maximum at t = ti
0. To prove the ¯rst statement that distributions in the
singleton family (5) satisfy this criterion for a su±ciently small di®erence t ¡ ti
0,
it remains to establish that the maximum strictly exceeds zero.
The fact that
^ tM0
S(^ t)=MS(^ t) > lnMS(^ t) (28)
for ^ t < 0 is a useful property of distributions in the singleton family (5). Observe
that both the left-hand and the right-hand side of (28) vanish for ^ t = 0. So, to
establish (28), it su±ces to show that its left-hand side increases faster than the
right-hand side for all ^ t < 0 as ^ t falls. Taking the ¯rst derivative of either side with
respect to ^ t shows that the increase in the left-hand side exceeds the increase in
the right-hand side by ¡^ t ¢ [M00
S(^ t)=MS(^ t) ¡ (M0
S(^ t)=Mµ(^ t))2] > 0 as ^ t falls, which
is a positive amount by ^ t < 0 and (5).
We know from theorem 2 that criterion (17) attains a maximum value of zero
for R = 0. So, if we can show that (the maximum of) criterion (17) strictly
increases in R, the ¯rst statement that distributions in the singleton family satisfy
(17) for su±ciently large R is proven. Taking the ¯rst derivative of (17) with
respect to R yields
@CritITC(t;ti
0)=@R = ¡lnMS(^ t) + ^ tM0
S(^ t)=MS(^ t) > 0
for ^ t ´ ti
0=(1+R) < 0. The derivative is strictly positive by fact (28). So, if R > 0,
criterion (17) holds for ti
0 > 0 in a neighborhood around t but fails otherwise.
Uniqueness of the information and the no-information equilibrium follows since no
more than one investor can optimally acquire an indivisible public commodity by
de¯nition 1.
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